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Do enforcement actions by US federal banking regulators against Banks for unsound and 
unsafe banking practices deter further and future wrongdoing?  
A way forward. 
 
 
     Thesis Statement 
 
Because current deterrent measures have consistently proved to be ineffective, a more 
rigorous punishment such as jail time is necessary for CEO’s directors, management, and 
employees of financial institutions who engage in unsound and unsafe banking practices. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
“Wells Fargo fined $1 billion for ‘reckless unsafe or unsound practices.”1  The story 
behind this headline in the Washington Post on April 20, 2018, set out the problem.  Wells Fargo 
engaged in “unsafe or unsound practices”2 by charging customers for services that Wells Fargo 
should have absorbed and administering a compulsory insurance scheme that unnecessarily 
increased borrowers auto loans financial obligation without approval. 3 According to the Office 
of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), “Since at least 2011, the Bank4 (Wells Fargo) has 
failed to implement and maintain a compliance risk management program commensurate with 
the Bank’s size, complexity and risk profile.”5  The OCC also found that “a comprehensive plan 
to address compliance risk management deficiencies, fill critical staffing positions,”6 enforce “a 
reliable risk assessment and testing program and report compliance concerns adequately to the 
board was”7 not implemented.”8  
 
                                                        
1 Renae Merle, Wells Fargo fined $1 billion for 'reckless unsafe or unsound practices'The 
Washington POST (2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/wells-fargo-
fined-1-billion-for-reckless-unsafe-or-unsound-practices/2018/04/20/3d68340e-449e-11e8-bba2-
0976a82b05a2_story.html? utm_term=.636a442fc3f1 (last visited Jul 27, 2019). 
2 “Unsafe and unsound practices” is used interchangeably with, illegal conduct, bad behavior, 
wrongdoing and misbehavior 
3 https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/cfpb_wells-fargo-bank-na_consent-
order_2018-04.pdf  
4 The terms, bank, banking institution, institution and financial institution are used 
interchangeably. 
5 Id. 3 
6 Id 
7 Id 
8 Id. 
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This was not the first enforcement action by regulators9 against Wells Fargo. Two years earlier 
(2016), Wells Fargo was fined $185 million over what the Consumer Financial Protection Board 
(CFPB) called "the widespread illegal practice of secretly opening unauthorized deposit and 
credit card accounts."10 Responding to Wells Fargo’s 2016 and 2017 extensive customer 
exploitation and other compliance failures, the Federal Reserve Board required Wells Fargo to 
dismiss four of its board members and restricted the firm from growing any larger than its 2017 
asset size.11 
 
Previous enforcement actions did not appear to deter Wells Fargo from subsequent 
“unsound and unsafe” banking practices. According to a summary from Violation Tracker, a 
comprehensive database on organizational wrongdoing that covers banking, since 2000, leading 
up to 2018, Wells Fargo has racked up over fourteen billion dollars in fines from federal 
regulatory agencies ($14, 943,253,793).12  
Announcements of various enforcements’ actions and settlements show how banks, in 
addition to Wells Fargo, routinely engage in illegal conduct.13  For example, in June 2014, BNP 
was fined “$8.9 billion for breaching of U.S. sanctions against”14 Iran, Sudan and Cuba.15  
Twenty-three other financial institutions were collectively fined over $1.2 billion for sanction’s 
                                                        
9 For purposes of this thesis, regulators will be variously referred to as, Federal banking regulator (s), 
enforcement authorities, banking regulators and enforcement bodies. 
10 https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/092016_cfpb_WFBconsentorder.pdf, 
11 https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/enforcement20180202a.htm,. 
12 Wells Fargo: Violation Tracker, WELLS FARGO | VIOLATION TRACKER, 
https://violationtracker.goodjobsfirst.org/parent/wells-fargo (last visited Jul 27, 2019). 
13 https://www.americanbanker.com/slideshow/the-seven-largest-sanctions-related-
fines-against-banks, 
14 Id 
15 Id 
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violation by the Office of Foreign Assets and Control (OFAC) in 2014.16 “In August 2014, Bank 
of America paid approximately $17 billion for offering subprime loans that brought about the 
2008 financial crisis and distorted the standard of the loans to regulatory authorities - Federal 
Housing Authority, Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae.”17 Banks’ eagerness and willingness to settle 
for these huge monetary fines and sanctions show willful intent to violate the law and an 
intended way of doing business. Equally, the government’s preparedness to mete out the same 
punishment repeatedly while creating an enabling atmosphere for the banks to conduct business 
by granting waivers18 guarantees the continuance of misconduct.”19  
Evidently, after each sanction the bank returns to business as usual. The market’s 
response to the offending bank is usually positive. Loss in stock value is usually short-lived.20 
The CEO’s, directors, officers and or employees responsible for the illegality do not serve jail 
time even though their actions sometimes results in the wiping away of individuals’ life savings.  
At most, the offending officer or employee is dismissed and the matter is ended.  However, the 
consequences of continuous and widespread violations of the law by banks erode the people’s 
faith and confidence in governmental institutions.   
                                                        
16 VICTORIA ANGLIN *, NOTE: Why Smart Sanctions Need a Smarter Enforcement 
Mechanism: Evaluating Recent Settlements Imposed on Sanction-Skirting Banks, 104 Geo. L.J. 
693, (2016), available at https://advance-lexis-
com.flagship.luc.edu/api/document?collection=analytical-materials&id=urn:contentItem:5J99-
R9G0-02BM-Y2M4-00000-00&context=1516831. 
 
17 https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/bank-america-pay-1665-billion-historic-justice-department-
settlement-financial-fraud-leading,  
18 JOEL SLAWOTSKY *, ARTICLE: REINING IN RECIDIVIST FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS, 40 Del. 
J. Corp. L. 280, (2015), available at https://advance-lexis-
com.flagship.luc.edu/api/document?collection=analytical-materials&id=urn:contentItem:5HBC-NV60-01DR-
M005-00000-00&context=1516831. 
19 Id 
20 Id. 
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It is against this backdrop of systemic wrongdoing by banks that section 1 of this paper 
introduces the continuous engagement of banks in unsound and unsafe practices despite 
regulatory enforcement actions. Section II of this paper will set forth the history and purpose of 
federal banking regulations. The objective is to be reminded that the purpose of banking 
regulation was always to guarantee the safety and soundness of financial institutions for the 
government to provide services to the people.  Section III examines the various types of unsound 
and unsafe banking practices federal regulation is intended to prevent.  
This section also discusses the possible reasons for the systemic and widespread unsound 
practices’. Because, the courts and regulators differed on what constituted unsound and unsafe 
banking practices, this paper narrowly examines that as a definitional issue. For the purposes of 
this thesis, the word “unsound and unsafe banking practices” is used interchangeably with illegal 
conduct, bad practices and unacceptable behavior. Section IV will analyze the intent and purpose 
of various enforcement actions to understand why illegal conduct by banks is not deterred. 
Section V concludes that current enforcement actions do not deter wrongdoing by banks. Banks 
have continued to engage in illegal conducts, despite the imposition of hefty fines and punitive 
orders. The same banks penalized lately had been punished before in settlements that was 
expected to reform and sanitize the system.  
 
Section V also proposes a harsher punishment through new legislation that will deter 
wrongdoing. New legislation is warranted because both banks and the government exploit 
current legislation that serves their self-interests in reaching settlements that do not deter further 
and future wrongdoing. A federal Judge, Jed Rakoff wondered why no high-level bank executive 
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was prosecuted post 2008 financial crisis.21 Government prosecutors may be eyeing these banks 
as clients in a future career hence the reluctance to prosecute. 22The new legislation would take 
away the discretionary authority of the regulatory authorities to enter into any settlement or 
consensual orders in certain severe cases with serial offenders.  Recommendations would include 
mandatory minimum jail times, braking up of offending banks sometimes among other punitive 
measures. 
 
II. FEDERAL BANKING REGULATION 
a. History of Federal Banking Regulation 
Federal banking regulations shows from the onset that banking was going to be regulated 
in order to finance the government in the provision of services to the people.23  That is, the safety 
and soundness of banks would be paramount if the government was going to be successful. 
Banking regulation would be central to the American political system.24 The First Bank of the 
United States was chartered on February 17, 1791 as the first Central Bank of the United States 
for twenty years to control, supervise and solidify the development of state-chartered banks, 
                                                        
21 Jed S. Rakoff, The Financial Crisis: Why Have No High-Level Executives Been Prosecuted?, 
N.Y. REV BOOKS (Jan. 9, 2014), 
http://www.nybooks.com.flagship.luc.edu/articles/2014/01/09/financial-crisis-why-no-executive-
prosecutions/ [http://perma.cc/V5BQ-C2E9]; see also Robert Quigley, The Impulse Towards 
Individual Criminal Punishment After the Financial Crisis, 22 VA. J SOC. POL'Y & L. 103 
(2015); David Zaring, Litigating the Financial Crisis, 100 VA. L. REV. 1405, 1410-11 (2014)., . 
22 Robert Schmidt, SEC Goldman Lawyer Says Agency Too Timid on Wall Street Misdeeds, 
BLOOMBERG BUS. (Apr. 8, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/Q4MT-AR7Y., . 
 
23 Michael Wade Strong *, ARTICLE: Rethinking the Federal Reserve System: A Monetarist Plan for 
a More Constitutional System of Central Banking, 34 Ind. L. Rev. 371, (2001), available 
at https://advance-lexis-com.flagship.luc.edu/api/document?collection=analytical-
materials&id=urn:contentItem:43HV-4S70-00CV-F0SH-00000-00&context=1516831. 
24 Id. 
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finance the federal government and offer loans to the public.25 At the end of the twenty -year 
charters, the second Central Bank was chartered for twenty years on April 10, 1816 to continue 
to finance the government in providing services.26  The duty of the banks to provide fiscal 
services to the government was reasserted by the US Supreme Court in Osborn v. Bank of the 
United States.27 With the establishment of the Federal Reserve in December 23, 1913, the 
permanence of the Central Bank as the overall supervising authority over all banking activities 
was accomplished - with restoring financial stability, as it’s primary mandate.   
 
b. Evolutionary Trends of Federal Banking Regulation  
Most Federal banking regulations that were enacted was in response to a financial crisis 
caused by banks’ unsound and unsafe practices (illegal conduct). These unsound and unsafe 
practices attracted enforcement actions that included hefty fines.28  For example, Bank of 
America was sanctioned in 2014 for contributing to the 2008 financial crisis by originating risky 
loans, among other infractions.29 But pervasive illegal conducts have also attracted new 
regulatory burden especially when there has been a resultant crisis.30 It was the systemic 
widespread violations of existing laws and illegal conduct by banks that resulted in the 2008 
financial crisis that in turn evolved into an enactment of a new banking legislation- “Dodd-Frank 
                                                        
25 Id. 
26 Id. 
27 Osborn, 22 U.S. at 861.,. 
 
28 Id. 9 
29 Id.  
30 Id.  
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Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act. Dodd-Frank created the Consumer Financial 
Protection Bureau”31 (“CFPB”) and an enactment of the Volcker Rule.32 
The CFPB was established to prevent bank’s from engaging in predatory mortgage lending and 
the Volcker rule was enacted to limit banks investment options, by restricting speculative trading 
and abolishing proprietary trading.33 
The evolutionary trend of federal banking regulations shows the regulation of all sorts of 
issues such as privacy, disclosure, fraud, money laundering, terrorism, usury and lending were to 
try to curb and prevent unsound and unsafe practices.  
 
That there have been many successive federal banking regulations over the years is 
further proof that enforcement actions have not succeeded in deterring illegal conduct by banks.  
 
c. Federal Banking Regulators  
Banking regulatory agencies are government departments responsible for the actions of 
banking institutions.  The most important reason for the regulation of Banks is to guarantee the 
soundness and safety of banking institutions, protect customers and depositors, and ensure an 
overall effective financial and economic system.34   
 
                                                        
31 . https://www.investopedia.com/terms/d/dodd-frank-financial-regulatory-reform-bill.asp 
 
 
32 . https://www.investopedia.com/terms/d/dodd-frank-financial-regulatory-reform-bill.asp 
 
33 Id. 
34 https://www.kansascityfed.org/publicat/bankingregulation/RegsBook2000.pdf. 
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Banking regulation is carried out mostly through the following financial regulatory 
authorities that are charged with supervising banking functions, enforcing applicable laws and 
prosecuting enforcement actions against banks: 
 
 
i. Comptroller of the Currency 
The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency is the oldest federal bank regulatory 
agency.35 The National Currency Act of 1863 established the OCC and the National Bank Act of 
1864 strengthened the OCC’s powers.36 The OCC supervises and exercises control over 
operations of national banks.37 Furthermore, the OCC has oversight responsibilities with the 
authority to approve the formation and review of national bank, its branches and merger requests.  
 
ii. Federal Reserve System 
The Federal Reserve was established in 1913 with regulatory powers over all U.S. banks 
that are a part of the Federal Reserve System, all foreign banks in the U.S., all U.S. banks in 
foreign countries, large clearing systems, security’s corporations, loan and savings corporations, 
bank holding corporations, financial holding corporations.38 
 
 
 
iii. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 
                                                        
35 Id 
36 Id 
37 Id 
38 https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R44429 
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The Banking Act of 1933 established the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) 
with responsibility for regulating federally insured depository institutions and state banks.39 
 
iv. Department of Treasury 
The U.S. Department of the Treasury is the chief revenue collector for the U.S. 
government and printer of money.  Additionally, the Treasury Department regulates banks and 
savings and loans through the operations the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency and the 
Office of Thrift Supervision.40 
 
v. Department of Justice 
The US antitrust laws are enforced by the Department of Justice’s (DOJ) - antitrust 
division.  Banking is not exempt from antitrust enforcement as was established by the 1963, 
Supreme Court ruling in the United States v. Philadelphia National Bank41. Additionally, the 
DOJ along with other regulatory agencies have powers under the Bank Merger Acts of 1960, 
1966 and the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 to determine the competitive effect of bank 
mergers, acquisitions and consolidations request before approval.42  
 
vi. Securities and Exchange Commission 
                                                        
39 Id 
40 Id 
41 United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963) 
 
42 Id 27 
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The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) was established in 1934 with regulatory 
powers over all activities involving securities whether in a financial bank or in any investment 
entity.43   
 
vii. Federal Trade Commission 
The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) is charged with investigating deceptive or 
misleading business practices targeted at consumers. The FTC’s, main responsibility is limited to 
enforcing all consumer protection legislation including Truth in Lending Act. Namely, the FTC 
does not have enforcement powers over financial institutions.44 
 
 
viii. Office of Thrift Supervision and other Thrift Regulators 
The Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) is under the Treasury Department.  The OTS 
regulates all thrift institutions and its activities including licensing and operations of federal 
savings associations and federal saving’s banks.45 
 
III. UNSOUND AND UNSAFE BANKING PRACTICES 
The previous chapter discussed the history and evolution of federal regulations today. 
Additionally, federal regulatory agencies were highlighted with their various supervisory and 
enforcement powers over banks (activities), their directors, executives, and employees.  
                                                        
43 Id 
44 Id 
45 Id 
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The purpose of federal banking regulatory agencies (among others) is the prevention of unsafe 
and unsound banking practices. It is so important to understand the meaning of the term, 
“unsound and unsafe banking practice” that justifies enforcement actions. 
 
a. Definitional issues of unsafe and unsound banking practices 
The term “unsound and unsafe practice” appears to have been first used in banking law 
without definition in 1933 when “the Board of the Federal Reserve System”46 (“Federal 
Reserve”) adopted the term in dismissing a bank official from office.47 It was later used in two 
provisions terminating insurance coverage.48 
 
As a phrase, “unsound and unsafe banking practice” is not defined formally in any 
federal regulation. However, “John Horne, then Chairman of the Federal Home Loan Board”49 in 
a material provided to Congress in 1966 defined “unsound and unsafe banking practice” as  “any 
action, or lack of action, contrary to generally accepted standards of prudent operation, the 
possible consequences of which, if continued, would be abnormal risk or loss or damage to an 
institution, its shareholders, or the agencies administering the insurance funds.”50 The Office of 
                                                        
46 46 T. Holzman, “Unsafe or Unsound Practices: Is the Current Judicial Interpretation of the 
Term Unsafe or Unsound?.” 19 Ann. Rev. Banking L. 425, 428-29 (2000). 
47 T. Holzman, “Unsafe or Unsound Practices: Is the Current Judicial Interpretation of the Term 
Unsafe or Unsound?.” 19 Ann. Rev. Banking L. 425, 428-29 (2000). 
48 Id. 
49 Financial Supervisory Act of 1966: Hearings on S. 3158 Before the House Comm. On Banking 
and Currency, 89th Congress., 2d. Sess. 49 (1966) Statement of John E. Horne, Chairman of 
FHLBB), 112 CONG. REC. 26, 474 (1966). 
 
50 Financial Supervisory Act of 1966: Hearings on S. 3158 Before the House Comm. On Banking 
and Currency, 89th Congress., 2d. Sess. 49 (1966) Statement of John E. Horne, Chairman of 
FHLBB), 112 CONG. REC. 26, 474 (1966). 
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the Comptroller of Currency (OCC) and other federal regulatory agencies adopted and continue 
to use Horne’s definition of “unsound and unsafe practices” in all its enforcement actions.   
 
However, the courts have differed among themselves, with the OCC and federal 
regulatory agencies in its definition and application of what are unsound and unsafe banking 
practices.51 
In differing with the OCC and federal regulatory agencies in what is unsound and unsafe 
practices, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in Gulf Federal Savings & Loan Association v. 
Federal Home Loan Bank Board rejected Horne’s widely used definition of unsound and unsafe 
practices in enforcement proceedings.52 Instead, the Fifth Circuit defined “unsafe or unsound 
practice” as “conduct that when engaged in, would be contrary to generally accepted standards of 
prudent operation (that is, it constituted an imprudent act), the possible consequences of which, if 
continued, created an abnormal risk or loss or damage to the financial stability of the Bank.” 53 
b. Types of Unsound and Unsafe Banking Practices 
The conflicting federal decisions created no uniformity in what amounted to unsound and 
unsafe practices in enforcement actions. As a result, the OCC seized the opportunity “In The 
Matter of Patrick Adams, OCC AA-EC-11-50,” and issued a comprehensive guidance rejecting 
other contrary Federal Courts definition on what constituted unsound and unsafe practice in lieu 
of its enforcement powers.54 The OCC confirmed Horne’s definition of unsound and unsafe 
                                                        
51 
http://montanabankinglawyer.com/uploads/3/4/0/1/3401471/padamsfinaldecision093
014.pdf 
52 Gulf Federal Savings & Loan Association v. Federal Home Loan Bank Board, 651 F.2d 259 
(5th Cir. 1981). 
53 Id. 
54 Id. 29 
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practices which OCC and all federal regulatory agencies have relied on in enforcement actions, 
which is “any action, or lack of action, which is contrary to generally accepted standards of 
prudent operation, the possible consequences of which, if continued, would be abnormal risk or 
loss or damage to an institution, its shareholders, or the agencies administering the insurance 
funds.”55 
 
The Comptroller of OCC also declined its own Administrative Law Judge’s (ALJ) 
recommendations to follow the decision of the fifth and D.C. circuits (the two circuits with 
jurisdiction over the Comptrollers decision).56 Citing a Supreme Court Case, Brand X, 57 the 
Comptroller held the OCC was not bound by the (Courts) two circuits decisions because a 
judicial construction of an ambiguous statutory term in a statute an agency is responsible for 
administering does not preclude the agency from reaching a contrary decision if the judicial 
ruling was not based on the plain meaning of the statute.58  The Comptroller further stated that 
since “unsound and unsafe practice” had never been determined to have a plain meaning the 
OCC was not bound to follow any court’s ruling.  
 
Unfortunately, the OCC’s definition is self-serving because it allows the regulators to 
determine after-the-fact and with little advanced guidance whether a given practice is unsafe or 
unsound. In fact, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) Inspector General criticized 
- the FDIC in one of its enforcement activity for creating - “rules by enforcement” instead of 
                                                        
55 Id. 28 
56 Id. 34 
57 National Cable & Telecommunications Assn. v. Brand X Internet Services, 545 U.S. 967 
(2005) 
58 Id. 
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issuing formal guidance. 59  Following up in the criticism of FDIC’s approach in a related 
congressional hearing, Rep. Sean Duffy explained: 
 
“It is hard enough to comply with rules that are put out that people are trying to read and try to 
comply with but it is even harder when you have a regulatory body of our financial industry that 
tries to enforce first and give guidance later. We should know what the rules are, the rules of the 
game should be clear.”60 
 
In sum, definitional issues have not prevented regulatory authorities from continuous 
enforcement actions. Given the regulators “creating rules by enforcement approach” and to avoid 
an enforcement action, banking institutions and its employees should follow the OCC’s 
definition – by desisting from unusual activities (new acts not approved by regulators), actions 
that potentially cause financial harm to banks, investors or supervising governmental agencies. 
An analysis of enforcement actions of the Federal Reserve61 shows that federal regulators have - 
and could term any improper conduct as unsound and unsafe. Conducts that have been termed 
unsound and unsafe are: 
a. Improper loan application procedures 
b. Bad underwriting of a loan 
c. Extending credit contrary to bank policy 
d. Negligent supervision of institution lending practices 
                                                        
59 https://www.americanbanker.com/news/lawmakers-troubled-by-fdics-supervisory-
treatment-of-banks 
60 Id. 
61 
https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/enforcement20190606a.htm 
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e. Extension or acquisition of non-performing loans 
f. Acquisition of personal loans from the bank 
g. Failure to comply with federal reporting requirements 
h. Unfair late fees 
i. Failure to perform due diligence in opening accounts. 
j. Removal of an employers’ Confidential Supervisory Information (CSI) and proprietary 
information by an employee and forwarding to the employee’s personal email62 
 
c. Consequences of Unsound and Unsafe Practices 
On the Economy 
Financial corruption causes lack of trust needed for “we” the people to do business with 
our financial institution that will in turn build up the economy.63 Furthermore, lack of trust leads 
to insufficient savings needed for economic growth.64 
 
The trust, necessary for the stability and functioning of the banking system is eroded.65 
In 2012, shortly after the financial crisis 23 percent and 19 percent of Americans trusted the 
banks and big corporations respectively.66 A 2007 research by two economic Professors found 
that trust impacted per capita income of 30 countries from 1949-2003.67 
A 2005 journal review of research on trust and economics found that trust is a contributory factor 
to economic, political and societal success.68 
                                                        
62 https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/files/enf20190606a1.pdf 
63 https://ritholtz.com/2012/05/people-are-losing-trust-in-all-institutions/ 
64 Id. 52 
65 https://www.americanbanker.com/opinion/time-to-clean-house-at-wells-fargo 
66 Id. 52 
67 Id 
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On the People 
 
People believe the system is corrupt and lose faith in government’s ability to deliver on 
promises.69 Unwillingness to comply with regulations possibly becomes the norm.70 
 
 
On Governance 
 
Getting people to support reforms and developing and driving policy becomes more 
difficult.71 Working for the government becomes an unattractive professional career.72 
People become incentivized to engage in corrupt practices like tax evasion. 73 
 
 
The consequences of unsound and unsafe practices on the fabric of a nation cannot be 
overstated. Nobel laureate economist, Kenneth Arrow writes that, “Virtually every commercial 
transaction has within itself an element of trust.”74 Ultimately, trust in the financial system is the 
engine of an economy, a failure of which is disastrous.75  
 
d. Why Banks engage in Unsound and Unsafe Practices? 
 
Evidently, despite seemingly harsh financial penalty and other enforcement actions 
documented in this paper against banks, and in some instances the same banks, banks continue to 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
68 Id 
69 Id 
70 https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/docserver/gov_glance-2013-6-
en.pdf?expires=1573439905&id=id&accname=guest&checksum=FB8D900B392410C51B98C9
A5D3661CC8 
71 Id 
72 Id 
73 Id 
74 Id 
75 Id 
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engage in unsound and unsafe practices as a way of doing business. It is probably safe to 
conclude that the current enforcement mechanism has failed to deter banks and its employees 
(who mastermind these illegal conducts) from they’re intentional wrongdoing for various 
reasons. 
Bank CEOs much like the typical CEOs in other industries appear not to be worried of any 
current form of enforcement actions.76 The following case study illustrates the lukewarm and 
disrespectful mindset of CEOs towards consequential outcomes, enforcement authorities and 
enforcement actions. 
 
Federal Reserve versus Jacob Goldstein77 
The Federal Reserve banned Jacob Goldstein, CEO of NBRS financial a Maryland bank 
from working in the banking industry for unsound and unsafe practices, which led to the failure 
of the bank in 2014.  
Goldstein allegedly breached the bank’s trust by engaging in a pattern of self- dealing. 
Specifically, Goldstein voted with the board to approve a disguised loan of $250,000 for a 
director’s son’s real estate investment - when in fact it was for his (Goldstein) personal use. 
Furthermore, Goldstein and the bank gave an unsecured $100,000 loan to a company he had one 
– sixth interest in.  
According to the Federal Reserve, “The bank failed, in part, because of Goldstein’s dominant 
influence over the bank’s operations which limited the institution’s ability to overcome its 
deteriorating financial condition and Goldstein’s engaging in improper business practices for his 
                                                        
76 https://www.housingwire.com/articles/46502-former-president-and-ceo-of-failed-bank-nbrs-
financial-banned-from-banking/ 
77 Id 
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benefit.” Goldstein resigned from the bank and failed to respond to charges against him by the 
Federal Reserve. Goldstein was later banned from the banking industry by default. Goldstein’s 
snobbish actions offer an insight into the nonchalant attitude of CEOs towards federal 
enforcement actions.  
 
Further to the CEOs controlling mindset, recently, the “Business Roundtable” came up 
with what they thought the purpose of a corporation ought to be. 78 The statement of purpose was 
changed to read, “ no longer should decisions be based solely on whether they will yield higher 
profits for shareholders, rather corporate leaders should take into account “all stakeholders” – 
which is, employees, customers and society writ large.”79 The Business Roundtable is a group, 
led by JPMorgan Chase & Co. (a bank) CEO James Dimon.80 However, these CEOs were not 
authorized by their respective shareholders to add or alter their respective purposes. The Council 
of Institutional Investors in disapproving, said the new statement of purpose gives CEOs cover to 
dodge shareholder oversight and there was no mechanism of accountability to anyone else.81 
Some CEOs declined to endorse the statement of purpose stating that the CEOs endorsing the 
concept where CEOs who like to be in control and don’t like to be subject to market demands.82 
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The shareholders of these financial institutions shoulder the responsibility of the hefty monetary 
penalty imposed rather than the CEOs and other bank employees. 83  Regulators have levied over 
$305 billion in penalties on financial institutions (shareholders) since 2000 for unsound and 
unsafe practices.84 
 
There is also an apparent hesitation to truly punishing financial institutions. According to 
a former SEC regulator, senior regulators at SEC, "were more focused on getting high-paying 
jobs after their government service than on bringing difficult cases." 85  The persistent 
wrongdoing of financial institutions suggests insufficiency of current enforcement actions as a 
deterrence and incentive to change behavior. 86  Passivity and disinclination to amend the 
defective system manifest to new banking institutions and disincentives regulatory compliance 
while encouraging bad behavior. When investors are the ones paying the fines rather than the 
directors or officers, who perpetrated the acts, deterrence as a motive for enforcement actions 
becomes ineffectual.87 The fines imposed on these offending institutions pale compared to their 
humongous profits. 88  Selfish purposes of the principal actors: regulators, prosecutors and 
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government coffers - enable the unsound and unsafe practices of financial institutions and its 
employees. 89 
 
IV. BANKING ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS 
a. History of Banking Enforcement Actions 
Historically, mandatory jail time for bankers and its employees for unsound and unsafe 
practices have never been required by any law as part of an enforcement action. Various 
enforcement actions have however, been key supervisory tools for regulatory authorities to 
maintain the safety and soundness of banking institutions. Thirty years after the FDIC’s creation, 
and because of the punitive nature of its power to end an institution’s deposit insurance and its 
limited scope, congress passed the Financial Institution Supervisory Act (FISA) in 1996. Per 
FISA, federal regulators issued Cease and Desist Orders for violations of existing laws or 
detrimental acts that impacted soundness of financial institution and orders for corrective action. 
The Financial Institution Regulatory and Interest Rate Control Act (1978) 90  gave 
regulators expanded powers to levy Civil Money Penalties (CMP’s) for continuous violation of 
existing laws and, or, failure to comply with previous Enforcement Actions (EA). Following the 
savings and loan crisis in the 1980s, the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and 
Enforcement Act (FIRREA)91 and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act 
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(FDICIA)92 was passed in 1989 and 1991, respectively, giving regulator’s more enforcement 
powers. FIRREA and FDICIA gave regulators powers - to set capital requirements, overhaul the 
deposit insurance system, to demand that banks change management, remove/suspend personnel, 
limit growth, and cease dividend payments. Per FIRREA, actions of institution-affiliated parties 
(IAPs) who relate and deal with banking organizations such as brokers, attorneys, or third-party 
technology service providers (TSPs), could now be regulated. Enforcement Actions (EA) were 
now required to be publicly disclosed. Subsequently, since 2000, most EAs are now available on 
each regulatory authority’s website. 
 
More recently, various titles in the Dodd Frank Act 93  strengthened federal banking 
regulators’ oversight of the banking industry and intensified their focus on governance and risk 
management. 94  The Dodd-Frank Act established the CFPB 95  to consolidate and bolster 
policymaking and enforcement powers in the consumer protection area.96 No doubt, the banking 
regulatory authorities have grown to possess expansive powers to prevent and correct unsafe and 
unsound banking practices by financial institutions, its employees, and other associated persons 
and organizations.97 The outcome of the regulatory agencies preventive and corrective powers is 
the application of various types of banking enforcement actions on erring financial institutions.   
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b. Types of Banking Enforcement Actions 
Regulatory enforcement actions are divided into informal and formal enforcement actions none 
of which includes mandatory jail time.  
 
i. Informal Enforcement Actions 
Informal actions are designed to correct identified deficiencies and ensure compliance 
with banking laws and regulations.98 Informal actions include commitments by the Board of 
Directors/trustees of a financial institution.99 Voluntary commitment is utilized to obtain written 
commitments from a bank’s board of directors to ensure that identified problems and weaknesses 
will be corrected.100 Memorandum of Understanding is another form of informal action. MOUs 
are drafted and used by regulating authorities to get the banking institution to adequately address 
the deficiencies noted” during an examination.101 Informal actions are not disclosed publicly and 
not lawfully enforceable. 102 Although informal actions are not legally enforceable, however, 
failure to honor any commitment will give rise to a formal enforcement action.  
ii. Formal Enforcement Actions 
Formal enforcement actions by banking regulatory authorities are usually punitive 
statutorily mandated actions against banking institutions and their employees for various acts of 
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unsound and unsafe practices. The following enforcement actions have been brought by the 
Banking Regulators on a regular basis:103 
 
Formal Enforcement Action Against Institutions 
1. Cease and Desist Orders: Banking regulatory authorities have the power to issue a C&D 
order to a financial institution when that financial institution is about to get involved, in 
an unsafe or unsound banking practice or a breach of the law.104 Occasionally, C&D 
Orders are also called Consent Orders when it is based on the result of an agreement 
between a banking institution and the regulator. 105 Other times, a C&D order is called a 
temporary C&D when it is used to shield a bank from a possible danger or wrongfully 
depleting its resources.106 Significantly, C&D’s usually obligates the institution to 
restrictions, reporting requirements and consequences for non - compliance.107 
 
2. Formal Written Agreements/Supervisory Agreements (MOUs): These are “agreements” 
(also called Memorandum of Understanding) where the bank agrees to take actions and 
specific steps to remedy identified problems that could impact the safety and soundness 
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of the institution.”108 Before, Memorandum of Understanding (MOU’s) as they were 
mostly called, was not required to be disclosed and was unenforceable.109 But per 
FIRREA110, MOUs like C&D orders now require public disclosure upon execution, are 
enforceable and attract severe monetary penalties for non-compliance.111 Nonetheless, 
banking institutions prefer to style agreements as MOUs because MOUs are perceived 
less negatively than C&D orders.112 
 
3. Prompt Corrective Actions (PCA): The Law gives regulators the authority to require any 
bank depending on its precarious circumstances to raise its capital base to a mandatory 
minimum to protect its insurance funds.113 Under the “PCA” authority, regulators can 
confiscate a banking institution whose assets are less than 2 percent of its holdings.114 
 
4. Deposit Insurance Threat: The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) can 
suspend or, otherwise end a banking institution’s deposit insurance under the Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act (FDICIA). 115  To with, the banking 
institution could be stopped from operating for illegal conduct or a breach of the law.116 
The FDIC mostly initiates these types of proceedings, which puts the institution in the 
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precarious position of being seized by the primary regulator or state authorities where the 
bank is located.117 
 
5. Civil Money Penalty Orders (CMP): Civil Money Penalties are fines imposed on banking 
institutions for its unacceptable conduct. 118 
 
6. Restitution Orders: Restitution orders require the banking institution to pay the displeased 
parties or the regulatory body for losses created or for illegal earnings by the 
institution.119 
 
7. Call Report Infractions: Delay in reporting infractions required by law attracts financial 
sanctions.120  
8. Sanctions Due to a Home Mortgage Disclosure Act121 (HMDA) Violation: Prior to the 
Dodd – Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010122 (Dodd-Frank 
Act), banking institutions were required to report their lending data under the HMDA – 
failing to do so attracted some financial penalty.123 Dodd-Frank Act, has now transferred 
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the enforcement of the reporting need of banking institutions to report their lending data 
to the - Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB).124 
 
 
9. Safety & Soundness Orders (SASO): SASO orders outline specific actions that must be 
undertaken by banking institutions to remedy an identified issue by a regulatory 
authority. 125 These actions are plans developed by the errant institution.126  
 
 
10. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Intervention Powers: Under FDI Act,127 the FDIC 
may intervene and begin an enforcement action against an institution if the institution’s 
primary regulator fails to do so after a 60-day notice to the institutions primary 
regulator.128 
 
Formal Enforcement Action Against Individuals (Institutions Affiliated Parties (IAP)129 
1. Notifications: These are usually letters issued by a regulatory authority banning an Institution 
Affiliated Party (IAP) from use in a financial banking institution - upon criminal conviction 
of an unacceptable infraction - unless allowed by Law or a regulatory body to do so.130  
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2. Cease & Desist Orders against Individuals (C&D): These are orders against IAPs to stop 
some type of conduct or further punitive action would follow.131  
 
3. Civil Money Penalty Orders against Individuals (CMP): These are imposed fines against 
directors, officers and employees of institutions and Institution Affiliated Parties (IAPs) such 
as financial brokers and attorneys for some type of unacceptable act or conduct.132 Regulators 
often use this measure to get institutions to comply to a mandated corrective action.133  
 
4. Notices Filed (NFI): This is a notification to any of the Institutions Associated Parties 
(broker, attorney, etc.) that an "OCC Complaint" to either bar, suspend, or otherwise exact 
one form of punishment or another has been filed against the party before an Administrative 
Judge.134  
5. Removal/Prohibition Orders (REM): Directors and IAPs who are subject to prohibition 
orders are prohibited from participating in the affairs of any insured depository institution 
without prior regulatory approval.135  A prohibition could potentially permanently bar an 
institution’s employee and an Industry Associated Party from employment in the banking 
industry.136   
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6. Restitution Orders (REST): This is an order on an IAP who has garnered an unjust 
enrichment to pay back the financial institution that has sustained the loss or the FDIC. 137 
 
7. Securities Enforcement Actions against Individuals (SEI): These are wide ranging types of 
penalties by a regulatory authority against IAPs for violating securities law by engaging in an 
unacceptable trading related activity.138 
 
8. Prejudgment Asset Seizure Powers: Under the FDICIA, Banking Regulators on obtaining a 
court order, may proceed to confiscate a bank employee’s property.139 Regulators, however 
appear to use this powers sparingly.140 
In addition to the listed enforcement actions, regulatory authorities have very broad latitude to 
impose sanctions for whatever they subjectively term unsound and unsafe practices. Regulators 
also have discretionary authority to capital directives (regarded as administratively un-
reviewable by the courts) to an institution requiring immediate compliance.  
 
 
iii. Consequences of Enforcement Actions 
 
An enforcement order in whatever shape or form could quickly become an unexpected 
source of liability for the financial institution. Enforcement orders usually reveal illegal conduct, 
which led to the sanctioning of the institution consequently opening up an avenue for a class 
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action lawsuit by investors against the bank’s directors and management.141 The institution’s 
resources may be further committed in defending additional enforcement actions usually directed 
at management employees at the institution, who perpetrated the conduct that triggered the 
investigation.142 
 
Enforcement actions attract unneeded negative and adverse publicity.  The Financial  
 
Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act (FIRREA) and the Federal  
 
Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act (FDICIA) requires regulators to publish 
issuance of final C&D orders and MOUs.143   
 
Furthermore, public corporations must report and disclose pending enforcement actions 
and contents of orders and agreements.144 Also, privately held corporations are not exempt from 
the disclosure requirement.145 There is a heightened degree of personal liability for senior 
members and officers of an institution when executing a C&D and an MOU. This is because, the 
senior member of management who signed the C&D and MOU on behalf of the institution will 
be held personally responsible if the institution fails to take the promised remedial action.  
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Because of the complexity of enforcement actions and skill and experience required to 
provide effective representation, the cost of legal representation can be significant to the banking 
institutions, particularly in complex complicated cases.146 
 
The consequences of enforcement actions on financial institutions, and its staff could be 
strangulating and quite draconian. Yet, institutions continue to engage in unsound and unsafe 
practices as a way of doing business. 
 
 
Since current enforcement actions have failed to deter future and further wrongdoing, a 
more rigorous mandatory punishment such as jail time instead of the - sometimes discretionary 
jail time, rarely imposed under a criminal statute - is necessary for directors and employees of 
these financial institutions who engage in illegal conduct. 
 
Much has also been written on exacting mandatory jail time on CEOs and employees of 
financial institutions for unsound and unsafe practices. However, these recommendations 
amounted to nothing - a result of various reasons already discussed in this paper. 
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c. Analysis of Banking Enforcement Actions 
 
An analysis of banking enforcement actions is how often CEO’s, executives and 
employees of banking financial institutions are jailed for unsound and unsafe practices. 
 
i. How often are Bankers Jailed for Unsound and Unsafe Practices? 
 
CEOs of financial institutions have been jailed before for unsound and unsafe practices. 
During the eighty’s loans and savings crisis147, over seven hundred people (including CEOs) 
were prosecuted, convicted and jailed. 148 Nevertheless, the overwhelmingly sentiment is that 
CEOs, executives and employees of banks are often not prosecuted and jailed for their crimes.  
 
 
ii. No banker was jailed for the most recent financial crisis. Myth or Reality? 
 
There is also the perception that no top financial banker in the U.S. was jailed for 
unsound and unsafe practices that led to the most recent financial crisis. Publications on this 
capture this widely held view. The Washington Post writes, “Zero Wall Street CEOs are in jail,” 
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for wrecking the world economy.149 New York, Review of Books carries an article (2014) that 
wonders why no executives have been prosecuted five years after the financial crisis.150  
 
However, in 2018, the Financial Times (FT) - after searching records and news reports 
across Europe and the US to uncover how many bank CEOs and employees received jail 
sentences for the financial crisis - concluded that one high ranking banking official in the U.S. 
was prosecuted and jailed. 151 Kareem Serageldin, “an executive at Credit Suisse was sentenced 
to 30 months in jail for lying about the value of his bank’s securities-Serageldin approved the 
concealment of hundreds of millions in losses in Credit Suisse’s mortgage-backed securities 
portfolio.”152  The Judge described Serageldin’s conduct as “a small piece of an evil climate 
within the bank and with many other banks.”153  
 
According to the Judge, other banker’s conduct was far worse. Credit Suisse hid $2.7 
billion in losses.154Merill Lynch hid $4 billion.155  Lehman Brothers, AIG, Citigroup, 
Countrywide and other financial institutions admitted reporting fewer losses that they 
incurred.156 Yet, only one person was reportedly jailed. It is important to point out that 
prosecutions that resulted in jail time were carried out under criminal statutes with – usually - 
five-year statute of limitations. 
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However, the fact still remains that prosecuting and jailing bankers is not the norm 
considering the enormity and consequences of their illegal conduct on their various institutions, 
families, society, economy and the world at large. Most widely applied consequences for illegal 
conduct by financial officials, is punitive fines and disbarment of culpable officials. 
 
 
iii. Convergent Factors Enabling Government Reluctance to Prosecute and Jail Bankers  
The reluctance to jail CEOs and other high level executives of financial institutions is 
mostly convergent factors. Ironically, the reluctance to prosecute and jail culpable bankers has 
enabled these unsound and unsafe practices (already discussed in this paper).  
 
There is also a general belief that the enormous powers of the CEOs accompanying with 
an aggressive ever- ready legal team have intimidated the prosecutors into timidity to 
prosecute.157  Additionally, the government believes that a publicized prosecution may impact an 
already compromised economy by furthering financial instability.158 A former U.S. attorney 
general (serving as AG then) said, “I am concerned that the size of some of these institutions 
becomes so large that it does become difficult for us to prosecute them when we are hit with 
indications that if you do prosecute, if you do bring a criminal charge, it will have a negative 
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impact on the national economy, perhaps even the world economy.” 159 He later denied the 
statement even though he was on record. 
 
iv. Jailing Bankers would Lead to Loss of Needed Financial Talent  
There is a feeling that the imposition of jail time for unsound and unsafe practices would 
drive away needed talent in the financial industry. This is however not supported by facts.  There 
is no evidence to suggest that the banking industry has ever been in want of talent. Or, that the 
banking industry has had difficulty-recruiting personnel.  After banking CEO’s and executives 
were jailed for the savings and loan’s scheme in the 80’s, financial talents did not dry up for 
employment. Additionally, current enforcement actions such as cease and desist orders and 
outright dismissal of crooked executives from employment has not prevented future bankers 
from seeking a career in the financial industry.   
 
Moreover, the assumption that jailing crooked executives and employees for unsound 
practices would drive away talented bankers infers that the banking industry’s success is 
inherently driven by corrupt practices. And that is definitely not true.  Another idea is that jailing 
CEO’s and employees would undermine the public’s confidence and trust in their public 
institutions. In any case, the public’s trust in public institutions is already low and has been the 
case for quite some time. In 2016, only 27 percent of US adults had confidence and trust in their 
banking institutions.160 2006 to 2009 recorded a 27 percent drop in the people’s confidence in 
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banks.161 Nonetheless, most economists believe that prosecuting and jailing criminals is 
necessary to restore trust needed to build the economy.162   
 
v. Abuse of Prosecutorial Discretion 
Indeed under American Law, government prosecutors have nearly absolute unreviewable 
power to decide what charges, if any, to bring.163  The issue now becomes, even after needed 
legislation is passed, how do we ensure that perpetrators are prosecuted when prosecutorial 
discretion is exercised in favor for not prosecuting perpetrators for unsound and unsafe 
practices? 
 
One way is through public pressure usually exacted through congressional hearings. The 
Congress has oversight responsibilities over executive agencies including the Department of 
Justice. The President appoints the US attorney’s charged with criminally prosecuting unsound 
and unsafe practices. Public pressure can force prosecutors to bring indictments against crooked 
bankers.    
 
V. CONCLUSION 
 
Mandatory Minimum Jail Time For Unsound Practices 
It is recommended that CEO’s, executives and employees serve mandatory minimum jail 
sentences for unsound and unsafe practices. The recommended mandatory minimum jail time 
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and the wider consistent clamor for some type of custodial sentence for culpable CEO’s and 
bankers, should not imply that the Department of Justice (DOJ) was ever constrained in their 
ability to bringing charges with jail sentences. In that context, the DOJ could always charge 
perpetrators of unsound and unsafe banking practices for various violations such as mail and 
wire fraud (which attracts a maximum of 20 years imprisonment), or a more general "securities 
fraud" (with maximum 25 years imprisonment), and possibly even racketeering, tax evasion, 
and/or obstruction of justice.164  However, specific targeted legislation such as the Insider 
Trading Act of 1988165 (dedicated for Insider Trading offenses) is needed for “unsound and 
unsafe banking” practice’s infractions. 
 
The Insider Trading Act of 1988 increased the liability penalties to all involved parties to 
illegal insider trading166 to include serving up to 20 years – a significant jail time. Under this act, 
in 2011, Raj Rajaratnam, “billionaire hedge fund manager was sentenced to 11 years in prison 
for illegal insider trading.”167 Also in 2012, Matthew Kluger, a corporate lawyer was sentenced 
to serve 12 years by a New Jersey Judge for illegal tipping.168 A Reuter’s business news analysis 
in 2014 concluded that illegal insider traders in the US faced longer prison terms for 
violations.169  
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Arguably, it can be surmised that longer prison terms for illegal insider trading has 
brought more discipline and compliance to security laws and consequently deters criminal 
activity, at least to some extent. 
 
Legislation for unsound and unsafe practices that prescribes the following is 
recommended: mandatory minimum jail time for perpetrators in egregious situations such as 
bank failures and wasteful investment of depositor’s funds; eliminating the discretionary powers 
of regulatory authorities to enter into settlement and or consensual orders in certain severe cases 
that involve serial offenders; braking up of offending very large banks; elimination of statute of 
limitations in all prosecutions for the perpetrators; prevention of prosecutors and regulators from 
employment in the financial institutions they prosecuted for at least the numbers of years in 
which there is a pending supervisory agreement and concerning fines- no employment for at least 
3 years with the fined institution; and prevention of any government bailout fund for any 
institution that has engaged in any unsound practice. 
 
Enacting legislation that takes away some discretionary sentencing powers of courts and 
exacts a mandatory minimum jail time on culpable bank officials could probably have a deterrent 
effect in preventing unsound and unsafe banking practices as has been so in illegal insider 
trading.  
 
Mandatory minimum jail time for CEO’s and bank employees would be effective as a 
deterrence against engaging in unsound and unsafe practices. Arguably, large financial 
institutions are not deterred from illegal conduct by hefty fines anymore as they probably see it 
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as a new normal and a cost of doing business. Furthermore, an emerging wider consensus is that 
obligatory promises from banking institutions to change their corporate culture after admitting 
wrongdoing are a farce. Rather, it is believed that sending culpable executives to jail would have 
a greater effect in deterring unsound and unsafe banking practices.  
 
